On receipt of your message the Open Access Team will immediately investigate your claim, make an initial judgement of the validity of the claim and, where appropriate, withdraw the item in question from public view. and commitments towards various stakeholders. 2 Whether firms should engage in socially responsible activities and whether it is the role of the market or the state to correct the externalities that corporations create has been the subject of a much broader debate focusing on CSR. 3 Building a strong case for or against CSR has proven hard, as the economic benefits or detriments that may stem from CSR, respectively, are often difficult to quantify. 4 CSR practices are, however, adopted by various corporations worldwide more so today than ever in the past. 5 The takeover of certain socially responsible companies by multinational companies validates arguments purporting that business ethics are important in today's business world and may complement financial performance rather than undermine it. 6 The paper will discuss whether the law should 'step in' to safe- come. Section 5 of the paper will analyse the impediments to the symbiosis of CSR and takeovers and discuss whether both objectives of promoting CSR and facilitating takeovers can co-exist. The final part of the paper, section 6, will consider whether a claim to revise the EU Takeover Directive encompassing safeguards towards socially responsible practices and firm-specific investments merits value and discuss how such a proposal can be achieved.
CSR AND LONG-TERM GROWTH
The Commission in its 2011 Report provides a generic definition of CSR by redefining it as the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society. 8 On 25 October 2011, the European Commission approved a new 9 European strategy on corporate social responsibility, finding that it was vital to renew its efforts in promoting CSR in light of the social consequences stemming from the 2008 financial crisis. 10 Arguments put forward by the Commission in favour of enterprises adopting CSR polices are that CSR benefits the enterprises as such, as well as society as a whole. 11 According to the Commission's Report, the corporation's aim should be to maximize the creation of shared value for shareholders, as well as other stakeholders and society at large, and to identify, prevent, and mitigate possible adverse impacts on society. 12 In its Report, the European Commission acknowledges that in promoting the adoption of CSR practises, it is important to enhance market rewards for CSR in view of the fact that those in charge of corporate decisions are often faced with the dilemma of behaving socially responsibly when such an undertaking would not necessarily be the most financially beneficial option in the short term. 13 In relation to investment in particular, the Commission stresses its commitment to support 'capacitybuilding for investors on how to integrate non-financial information into investment decisions', as it is considered that were investors take into account relevant non-financial information this would likely contribute to 'a more efficient allocation of capital and better achieve longer-term investment goals'.
14 In its 2011 Report, the European Commission purports that in order to achieve the maximization of shareholder value, enterprises need to adopt a long-term, strategic approach towards CSR. 15 In the Report, the Commission further recognizes that in order to further develop its CSR policy, there is a need to adopt a balanced multistakeholder approach, to clarify what is expected of enterprises, to promote market reward for responsible business conduct, to address company transparency on social and environmental issues from the point of view of all stakeholders, and to acknowledge the role of complementary regulation in creating an environment that prompts corporations to voluntarily assume social responsibility. 
THE VALUE OF THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE'S STAKEHOLDER-ORIENTED PROVISIONS
The Takeover Directive contains provisions that aim first and foremost to provide shareholders with enough information on the bid so as to make an informed decision when exercising their right to exit the company by tendering their shares. This is realized by information on the bid being effectively transmitted to the shareholders of the offeree company. The provisions are not a guarantee that shareholders are to be protected from bids that may be improper or opportunistic or from bids that would negatively impact on the company's socially responsible behaviour towards employees, consumers, and/or the environment. A closer look at the provisions will
give an insight of the minimal value that the said provisions have in safeguarding shareholders', as well as stakeholders' interests. the board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid.
Article 6 stipulates the duties that need be observed by the offeror with regard to the information provided to the offeree company's
shareholders. An offeror is required to draw up and make public in good time an offer document containing the information necessary to enable the holders of the offeree company's securities to reach a properly informed decision on the bid . . . When it is made public, the boards of the offeree company and of the offeror shall communicate it to the representatives of their respective employees or, where there are no such representatives, to the employees themselves.
According to paragraph three of the same article, the offer document should contain information that includes: the offeror's intentions with regard to the future business of the offeree company and, in so far as it is affected by the bid, the and arguably vague expression of 'company as a whole' to form part of the article as found in the Directive's provisions at present. 21 The intentional vagueness attached to this provision in its current form is also reaffirmed by the fact that in earlier drafts of the Directive, there existed a General Principle 3(2)(c) whereby a duty was imposed on target directors to 'act in all the interest of the company, including employment'. This also, however, did not manage to form part of the current text. 22 One of the assumptions found in the Winter Report, of course, is that the discipline of management and relocation of company resources through the takeover process is 'in the long term in the bests interests of all stakeholders and society at large'. 23 The existing diversity of key concepts within the company laws of various EU Member States will not be easily overcome through any attempts to harmonize takeover regulation on an EU level. 24 The 'role of the company', for example, is a concept that varies significantly across EU countries. 25 The definition of 'shareholders interests' as such is also hard to define from a practical point of view, as shareholders are not always seen as a homogenous group. 26 The legal consequences that flow from the application of the articles in the Takeover Directive, which provide for information being transmitted by the bidding company to the employees of the target company, are arguably of minimal value, as they do not form part of a more all-inclusive framework protecting firm-specific investments. Considering that there is no legal duty, in company and securities law, or beyond, on shareholders to consider such issues, any obligation imposed on the offeree and the offeror boards in transmitting information regarding the impact of the bid on employees or on the business of the company in general, is considered useless, unless complemented by a broader framework that takes into account the value of firm-specific investments. Within the present legal framework, the likelihood of shareholders acting in their individual capacity to consider the impact of the acquisition on employees when making their decision about accepting or rejecting a bid is also arguably significantly low. 27 The Winter Report reaffirms this position explaining that regulating the obligations towards employees' rights during a takeover bid was not the focus of the Takeover Directive. 28 On this point, Vos and Heynen conclude that despite the Takeover Directive's provisions that allow for communication of information from both the offeror and offeree company to employees, it is evident to those familiar with the community's labour laws that the information communicated is, overall, of minimal value. 29 In this respect, they advocate that the application of complementary to the Directive legislation for the safeguard of employees is essential. shareholders, but the motion of outlining these factors in the Code by amending its current provisions failed, as the majority of the Committee considered that the takeover rules should not be too prescriptive within this context. 57 The Panel did, however, recognize that market participants are under the misconception that the determining factor when considering whether to recommend a bid or not is the offer price, so it committed itself to exclude the offer price as the sole determining factor in recommending a bid.
58
In relation to the recommendation provided by target directors to shareholders on the merits of the bid, the new edition of the Take 
THE SYMBIOSIS OF TAKEOVERS AND CSR
The theoretical function of takeovers is to correct managerial failure and oust underperforming companies from the market. , last vsited January 2012, who report on the overall wealth effects assumed to be created by takeovers, finding that the stark difference between the decrease of wealth effects in the long run as opposed to the increased wealth effects at and around the announcement period of the bid is attributed to methodological problems and problems related to the market efficiency assumption, namely that short-term studies based on this theory may overestimate the gains during the announcement period, while studies that take place in the aftermath of the acquisition have obtained more information about the takeovers, subsequently reassessing the expectations on returns from positive to negative. 
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75 APRIL 2012, VOLUME 9, ISSUE 2 that the problem can be narrowly identified in the fact that present scholarship has failed to address new market phenomena, namely:
1) separation of ownership from ownership' 67 and '2) the emergence of reaggregated forms of aggressive capital, largely unconstrained by legal or equitable duties to other stockholders or society as a whole. 68 As Strine explains, following such phenomena, with the board of directors having become highly sensitive to serving stockholders' unconstrained short-term interests, it is subsequent that there has been underinvestment in future growth. 69 Actors, such as hedge funds, which only emerged in significant numbers in recent years, have made the need to address short termism in corporate investments imminent. 70 The short time horizon in realizing profits is one of the reasons takeovers work as an impediment to the creation or preservation of implicit contracts that aim to secure profits in the long term. 71 For the purposes of progressing with restructuring freely, the corporate raider is normally not obligated by corporate law to continue any implicit contracts formed with stakeholders of the company during previous management. 72 If, however, it is the company's purpose to maintain 'a long-term sustainable vision' despite investors coming in and out of the company on a frequent basis, then it should be important for directors' to be aware of the company's exact strategy and disclose it to investors in the interim, 73 as well as to a prospective acquirer.
The quality and accuracy of the information on the corporations' business exchanged between the target and the acquiring company also play a crucial role in the development of CSR strategies, parallel to takeover activity occurring. Due diligence assessments, that is, the evaluation process to determine the value of a company before a bid is launched, are considered to constitute semi-legal frameworks through which the development and implementation of CSR can be realized. 74 In this respect, the rules related to the type of information that target shareholders are provided with are of significant importance. 75 The analysis above has signalled that there are sub-issues that should be taken into account when discussing the European Commission's parallel objectives of promoting CSR, as well as facilitating takeovers. Encompassing information on CSR practices in the share price, keeping directors' corporate strategies distinct from stockholders' short-term interests, as well as protecting the value already invested in CSR post a change in corporate control by promoting the exchange of accurate and complete information between target and acquirer, are all issues that one need to bear in mind when considering proposals for the revision of the Takeover Directive further on in section 6.
Practical Issues: Building the Case for CSR
Irrespective of arguments in favour or against the adoption of CSR provisions in the Takeover Directive, 76 the need for legal certainty and the need to address temporal market failures are both arguments that would support a 'stakeholder friendly' reform of the Directive.
Such proposals are in line with the Commission's goals, both its aim to promote CSR and secure certain objectives of the EU Takeover Directive itself. 77 The provisions identified in section 3 are problematic insofar as they broadly reflect the need to safeguard a company's socially responsible behaviour but are of minimal practical value in terms of safeguarding it. The need for legal certainty should prompt regulators to redefine key concepts in the Takeover Directive and elaborate on target directors' advisory role during a takeover bid. 78 The significance attached to target board recommendations is supported by empirical studies that find such recommendations as being the most important variable in determining takeover outcomes. 79 Defining the target directors' advisory role 80 in the EU Takeover Directive may thus well help secure fairer outcomes not only for investors but also ultimately for all parties affected by a change in corporate control.
Recent market failures indicate a dysfunctional market for corporate control, and this in turn has led policymakers to question whether the present legal framework does in fact threaten long-term growth. Non-available information on social costs or, in general, the long-term value of investments in the share price, which is used as an indicator of managerial efficiency for the purposes of a takeover, may be the cause of a dysfunctional market for corporate control, and in this respect CSR as a notion can be viewed as a way of addressing the imperfections and failures of markets. 81 As explained:
efficient resource allocation depends on markets yielding prices that reflect true social costs; when they fail to do so, such as when polluters fail to pay the cost, then the invisible hand can lead one in the wrong direction . . . Therefore instead of seeing corporate social responsibility as an assault on free markets, it can be argued that it will ultimately make markets, or at least companies more efficient.
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In considering all such factors, it is appreciated that the Takeover
Directive is not an all-encompassing regulatory tool with an aim of addressing all legitimate concerns that may arise from a change in corporate control. 83 What falls within the ambit of the Takeover Social and environmental concerns were also referenced. 88 In their economic analysis of the application of the Takeover Directive, the preliminary briefing of Marcuus Partners refers to the community control gap, which, as explained, increases the risk of negative externalities imposed by shareholders. The possible solutions outlined to mitigate such a risk are to restrict the free market for corporate control, to enhance community protection through increased regulation of company activities and increased accountability of shareholders, or finally to call upon management to act in the interests of the company as a whole. 89 From all three options, the present author proposes that the last option referred to need to be the subject of reform in the Takeover Directive for the purposes of safeguarding CSR practices parallel to the occurrence of takeover activity.
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Also important to our discussion of the revision of the takeover Directive with reference to CSR are the findings of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP Expert Survey Report on the 'Reform of EU Takeover Directive and of German Takeover Law', dated November 2011. 91 With regard to the role of the board of the offeree company, the Survey reports that a clear majority of the respondents supported a proposal to 'grant the target company's management a relatively broad discretion in a takeover process by applying the so-called business judgment rule'. 92 The Survey Report also provides respondents' views on whether takeover law in the respondents' jurisdiction achieves the right balance between bidder, target management, target shareholders, and other target stakeholders. 93 From the respondents who saw a misbalance between the different stakeholders' interests and who were asked about the balance that was struck by the takeover laws in their home jurisdiction, the majority thought that the takeover laws should better protect the interests of target shareholders -an opinion strongly supported by representatives of academic research, investment banks, and corporates -or better protect other stakeholders -an opinion supported by institutional investors. 
Proposals for Additional Clauses in the EU Takeover Directive
In the UK, the reform of the UK takeover rules prompted by the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft in 2010 led to a revised 10th edition of the Code, which came into effect on 19 September 2011. 95 The
Panel's commitment to exclude the offer price as the sole determining factor in recommending a bid has now made clear that target directors are not to provide advice that is merely affixed to the financial merits of the bid. 96 In light of the proposed 2011 change, the new interpretation of the section arguably gives target directors greater leeway in referring to the interests of various constituencies in their recommendation of a bid to target shareholders. 97 In an attempt to achieve a less arbitrary approach towards CSR on an EU level, the first proposal for reform suggested by the present author is to refer to the factors that need to be taken into account by the target board of directors when giving advice to the target shareholders 98 by making similarly to the UK amendment clear that:
The provisions of the EU Takeover Directive do not limit the factors that the board of the offeree company may take into account in giving its opinion on the offer pursuant to their obligation outlined in Article 9(5) of the Directive. In particular, when giving its opinion, the board of the offeree company should not be required to consider the offer price as the determining factor and should not be precluded by national laws from taking into account any other factors which it considers relevant.
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A provision as such would guide target directors in drafting their statements towards shareholders and prompt target directors to refer to the implicit versus explicit contracts set in place for employees or the capital that has been invested in research and development plans and that is not reflected in the share price but will nevertheless be realized in the long term. Allowing directors to take other factors into account, besides the share price, may well offer certain of the benefits that the business judgment rule is perceived to offer in the US. 100 Lipton and Rowe have found that the Delaware model 'has protected corporations and directors from pressure to respond to short-term dislocations in the stock market'. 101 Delaware managers have been amendment of the Takeover Code in September 2011, Clarke questioned the value of such disclosure requirements with reference to employment by using Kraft's failed commitment to keep the Somerdale facility open post its acquisition of Cadbury as a paradigm. In specific, Clarke explained that the particular information on employees was likely to be of limited value to target directors, since section 172 or the 9th edition of the Code would not have allowed them to take into account employees' interests over those of shareholders. 118 However, through the prism of the new section in the Code offering guidance on the factors that target boards can take into account when drafting their recommendations, the disclosure requirements may assist target directors in formulating a more 'allinclusive' opinion of a bid to target shareholders. Thus, a final proposal suggested by the present author is to allow for an increase in the information level of the offer document on an EU level as well. 119 Following the proposal of the minority view in the related question in the Freshfields Survey Report, it is proposed that additional information be included in the offer documents and that this obligation be outlined in the current version of the Takeover Directive in Article 6 paragraph 3, numbered '(0)', as one of the matters that the bidder needs to address in the offer document. 120 Specifically, the bidder should disclose '(i) information on its own CSR policies, and in specific its strategy, programmes and results on implementation, (ii) a detailed post-merger integration plan (in particular with respect to management positions, employment matters and CSR policies)'. 121 Such provisions would qualify as minimum standard provisions, allowing for national legislators to impose higher standards on the information provided in the offer document.
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The light regulatory touch recommended forms part of a broader framework that would have markets reflect CSR values in the share price, investors assessing the available information on CSR practices, and a single EU supervisory authority administering takeover activity ensuring that the parties involved abide by the rules. 
